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Interesting constructional questions involving statutes and clauses
in leases were answered in the cases decided during the survey period.
Adams v. Willis' involved a suit by the assignee of a lessee against
the grantee of the lessor for the specific performance of an option in
the lease to purchase the demised premises for a specified sum. Con-
struing the terms of the lease, the court found that the purchase
option survived a previous refusal by the lessee to purchase under a
separate "purchase refusal" clause giving the lessee the right of
preemption should the lessor decide upon a sale to a third party. The
plaintiff was held entitled to specific performance of the purchase
option despite the fact that the land had increased in value since the
execution of the lease.
One dictum in the Adams case seems worthy of comment. Since
the lease containing the purchase option had been recorded, defendant
grantee of the lessor was held to have record notice thereof. The
opinion then continues, "Indeed, the presence on the lot of a [filling
station] was sufficient to put him [defendant] on inquiry." The
quoted statement would seem to mean that a purchaser of land is not
entitled to the protection of the recording act if an investigation of
the possession of the land would have disclosed the existence of an
interest created by an unrecorded instrument required to be recorded.
If this is the intended meaning, the validity of the statement is most
doubtful in view of the Act of 1888,2 providing, in effect, that posses-
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 225 S.C. 518, 83 S.E. 2d 171 (1954).
2. The Act of 1888 (20 STAT. 15), as contained in CODE or LAvs Or SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-109, reads as follows:
"What constitutes notice of unrecorded instrument.
No possession of real property described in any instrument of writing re-
quired by law to be recorded shall operate as notice of such instrument. Actual
notice shall be deemed and held sufficient to supply the place of registration
only when such notice is of the instrument itself or of its nature and purport."
The construction which has been placed upon the statute is that mere posses-
sion of land under an unrecorded instrument in writing required by law to be
recorded is not sufficient notice of the interest created by such instrument.
Foster v. Bailey, 82 S.C. 378, 64 S.E. 423 (1909) (possession under unrecord-
ed deed) ; Richardson v. Ellis, 112 S.C. 108, 98 S.E. 846 (1919) (possession un-
der unrecorded deed); Epps v. McCallum Realty Co., 139 S.C. 481, 138 S.E.
297 (1927) (possession under unrecorded contract of sale); Van Ness v.
Schachte, 143 S.C. 429, 141 S.E. 721 (1928) (possession under unrecorded con-
tract of sale). See Savannah Timber Co. v. Deer Island Lumber Co., 258 F.
777 (E.D. S.C. 1918), aff'd sub nomt. Deer Island Lumber Co. v. Savannah
River Lumber Co., 258 F. 785 (4th Cir. 1919). Of course, circumstances other
than the possession of land by the claimant under an unrecorded instrument
may be sufficient to charge a subsequent purchaser with notice of the outstand-
ing interest. See Oliver v. McWhirter, 112 S.C. 555, 100 S.E. 533 (1919).
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sion under an unrecorded instrument required to be recorded is not
notice to a subsequent purchaser. The authority3 cited by the court
in support of the dictum likewise is subject to the same criticism.
In Seaber v. Kohn4 the court was called upon by way of declara-
tory judgment to construe a clause in a lease for ten years providing
for an acceleration of rent for a period of one year should the lessees
remove their effects from the leased premises, and that lessor should
be vested with the same rights as though the entire term had expired.5
The point in issue was lessees' contention that under this clause they
might terminate their liability for future rent beyond the one year
period without the acquiescence of the lessor. The court construed
the clause to be a condition subsequent for the benefit of the lessor
rather than a conditional limitation (determinable limitation) which
would ipso facto terminate the lease. Without the assent of the
lessor, therefore, the lessees were unable thus to terminate their lia-
bility under the lease.
3. Barksdale v. Hinson, 212 S.C. 1, 46 S.E. 2d 170 (1948). In this case a
tenant in possession under a parol lease for one year was protected against a
subsequent purchaser of the premises without actual notice of the lease. Two
opinions are reported. The rationale of the first opinion is that an oral lease
for not to exceed one year is not required to be recorded, the Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1946 [44 STAT. 2584 (1946) ; CODX ov LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, 1952 Title 41] not having altered the prior law, and, therefore, a sub-
sequent purchaser without notice takes subject to such lease. (In other words,
at common law a prior legal interest prevails over a subsequent one, irrespec-
tive of the want of notice to the subsequent purchaser of the legal title.) The
second opinion questions the rationale of the first opinion, and justifies the de-
cision for the tenant solely on the ground that the subsequent purchaser would
be charged with notice of the lease from the fact of the t&ant's possession,
and, therefore, that he could not qualify as a bona fide purchaser without notice.
Since two of the justices concurred in the second opinion and only one in the
first, the second is actually the opinion of the court.
The reasoning of the second opinion seems demonstrably erroneous. If the
recording act does not require a lease for not to exceed one year to be re-
corded, the common law rule as to priorities is in effect, and the lessee as hold-
er of a prior created legal interest will prevail over any subsequent purchaser,
regardless of whether he purchased with or without notice of such prior legal
interest. On the other hand, if the recording act, construed in conjunction with
the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1946, requires the recordation of a lease
creating a term for not to exceed one year, very clearly the Act of 1888 pro-
viding that possession under a written instrument required to be recorded is
not notice to a subsequent purchaser, is applicable. Thus it seems that the
decision of the court properly may be justified only on the grounds adopted in
the first opinion.
4. 86 S.E. 2d 872 (S.C. 1955).
5. The exact language of the clause was as follows:
"And, lastly, it is agreed, that should said Lessee assign, transfer, sell, re-
move or in any manner dispose of the goods and chattels within the above
leased premises, then the entire amount of rent that would accrue for . . . one
year . . . shall be considered as due and payable, and the Lessor shall be
vested with the same rights as though the entire leased term had expired; but
payment for the same shall entitle said Lessee, . . . their heirs . . . and as-
signs, to all Lessee's rights of possession to transfer (as provided in this
Lease) for the additional term."
[Vol. 8
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In Thompson v. Rutland6 the statute7 providing that the magistrate
shall issue a warrant of ejectment if the tenant fails to show cause why
he should not be ejected was construed to require a written rather
than an oral warrant. The defendant landlord had oral judgment for
ejectment on 16 November, but a written warrant was not issued
until 27 November. Before the expiration of five days after the
issuance of the written warrant the tenant's possession of certain
of his chattels was disturbed under purported authority of the oral
judgment. In affirming a judgment for the tenant for the conversion
of his chattels, the court said that the tenant could not have been
legally evicted within five days after an effective judgment of evic-
tion.
In U. S. v. Scovil5 the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed a judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court9 in a case
involving the relative priority of a landlord's distress for rent under
the laws of South Carolina and a lien for unpaid taxes due the
United States.
One day before the appointment of a receiver for an insolvent
corporate debtor the landlord distressed upon assets of the debtor
for unpaid rent. Claim for this unpaid rent was filed with the re-
ceiver, as was a claim of the United States for payroll taxes owed
by the insolvent corporation. The assessment list for the unpaid pay-
roll tax was received by the Collector prior to the levy of the land-
lord's distress, but notice of the tax lien was not filed in the office
of the Register of Mesne Conveyances until after levy of the distress.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that since the landlord's
lien had been perfected by the distress prior to the appointment of
the receiver, under Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes, 10 the
United States could have no greater interest in the property in the
6. 225 S.C. 485, 83 S.E. 2d 163 (1954).
7. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952:
"§ 41-104. Tenant ejected on failure to show cause.
If the tenant fails to appear and show cause within the aforesaid ten days
then the magistrate shall issue a warrant of ejectment and the tenant shall be
ejected by his regular or special constable or by the sheriff of the county."
8. 75 S. Ct. 244 (1955).
9. U. S. v. Scovil, 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E. 2d 277 (1953), discussed in last
year's Survey of Landlord and Tenant, 7 S.C.L.Q. 121 (1954).
10. Rtv. STAT. § 3466 (1946), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1946) reads as follows:
"Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or when-
ever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or ad-
ministrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts
due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby estab-
lished shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient
property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which
the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached
by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
1955]
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hands of the receiver than had the insolvent. Regarding the con-
tention that the provisions of Sections 3670 through 367211 of the
Internal Revenue Code created a prior lien in favor of the United
States, the State Court held such lien not to take precedence over
a landlord's lien for rent which had been perfected by the levy of
a distress prior to the required filing12 of notice of the tax lien in
the office of the Register of Mesne Conveyances.
Reversing the judgment of the State Court, the United States
Supreme Court found the United States to have priority under Sec-
tion 3670,13 Internal Revenue Code. The landlord had a lien other
than a mortgage, pledge or judgment lien, nor was he a purchaser
within the meaning of Section 367214 of the Revenue Code. More-
over, the five day period within which, under Section 41-16015 of
the South Carolina Code, the tenant might have posted bond and
freed the property from the lien of the distraint had not expired
prior to the filing with the Register of Mesne Conveyances of notice
of the Government lien. Therefore, in the language of Mr. Justice
Minton, "the distress lien was not perfected in the federal sense at
the time the Government's liens were filed."
11. INT. Ri v. CODE § 3670, 26 U.S.C. § 3670 (1946). PROPERTY SUBJECT To
LIEN.
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount,
or addition to such tax, together with any costs that may accrue in addition
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." INT.
Riv. CODE § 3671, 26 U.S.C. § 3671 (1946). PERIOD ov LIEN.
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien shall arise at the
time the assessment list was received by the collector and shall continue until
the liability for such amount is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of
lapse of time." INT. REV. CODE § 3672, 26 U.S.C. § 3672 (1946). [As amended
by § 401, Revenue Act of 1939, c. 247, 53 STAT. 862, and § 505, Revenue Act of
1942, c. 619, 56 STAT. 798.] VALIDITY AGAINST MORTGAGEES, PLEDGEES, PUR-
CHASERS, AND JUDGMENT CREDITORS.
"(a) Invalidity of Lien Without Notice. -Such lien shall not be valid as
against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice
thereof has been filed by the collector -
"(1) Under state or territorial laws.- In the office in which the filing of
such notice is authorized by the law of the State or Territory in which the
property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has by
law authorized the filing of such notice in an office within the State or Terri-
tory; or"
12. CoDE or" LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 65-2722. Place of filing liens
and discharges thereof. Notices of liens for taxes payable to the United States
of America and certificates discharging such liens shall be filed in the office of
the register of mesne conveyances (or clerk of court in those counties in which
the office of register of mesne conveyances has been abolished) of the county
in this State within which the property sub)ect to such lien is situated.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. See note 11 supra.
15. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 41-160.
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Legislation
By act16 approved 28 January 1955, South Carolina Code Sec-
tion 41-61,17 providing for the termination of farm tenancies in cer-
tain counties on the first day of December in each year, was amended
to add Florence County to the list of counties included therein.
16. 49 STAT. 2 (1955).
17. CODEO F LAWs OF SOUTHf CAROLwA, 1952 § 41-61.
1955]
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